We develop a general framework for parameter estimation that allows only trusted parties to access the result and achieves optimal precision. Adversaries can access information, but only at the risk of getting caught at it (cheat-sensitivity). By combining techniques from quantum cryptography and quantum metrology, we devise cryptographic procedures for single parameter estimation when an arbitrary number of parties are involved.
Classical protocols for sharing measurement results, e.g. secret location sharing [1] [2] [3] [4] , use classical encryption schemes that rely on assumptions such as a bounded computational capacity of the adversaries. Quantum cryptography [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] instead promises unconditional security: the only assumptions are the laws of physics, and a correct implementation. Here we introduce a general framework for quantum cryptographic protocols specifically suited to the task of securing measurement outcomes (parameter estimation) while retaining the highest available precision allowed by quantum mechanics (quantum metrology). Clearly, one could perform optimal parameter estimation and then use conventional quantum cryptographic protocols to securely transmit the result. As we show here, thanks to the quantum nature of the states employed in quantum metrology, this two-step procedure is unnecessary and simple modifications of conventional quantum metrology protocols allow secure transmission of the estimated parameter. This is particularly relevant in multi-party scenarios where the measurement outcomes must be shared. While a few such schemes have appeared in the literature [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] , they were suited only to specific cases. Here we give a general framework that can be adapted to any quantum metrology protocol, which can be turned into a quantum secured one with the prescriptions given below. Security here is intended as cheat-sensitivity [16, 17] : adversaries can access information but only at the risk of being caught. This security model is appropriate only for situations in which the penalty of being caught is higher than the payoff of siphoning some information. The presented protocols can also achieve unconditional security under the hypothesis that Eve can interact with the probes only once.
Our goal is to securely and optimally estimate an arbitrary parameter ϕ, encoded onto a probe through a unitary operator U ϕ = e −iϕH , where H is a known Hermitian operator, in an ideal noiseless scenario. As is customary, we allow the eavesdropper Eve complete control of the channel where the probes travel (excluding the transformations U ϕ , obviously). The main idea is simple: in quantum metrology the measurement probes are prepared in an entangled state (e.g. the NOON state) which has the feature that separate measurements on each probe give no information on the parameter until they are jointly processed, because of the entanglement. Moreover, a test of correlations on a complementary observable of the probes can test for the presence of Eve as in conventional quantum cryptography: any action by Eve will ruin the correlation in at least one of two complementary properties. If she is detected, the protocol is terminated. For example, in the secret estimation of distance between two parties [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] H and ϕ represent the energy and the time of arrival of the probes respectively, which are the two complementary observables that must be tested to exclude the presence of Eve.
The optimality of the parameter estimation is achieved through quantum metrology [18] [19] [20] [21] . It establishes the best precision attainable in terms of the resources devoted to it: if one is allowed N uses of the transformation U ϕ , one can at most achieve the Heisenberg limit scaling of 1/N 2 in the variance (both in the finite dimensional [20] and in the infinite dimensional [22, 23] cases). Among the strategies to achieve the Heisenberg limit [20, 21] here we use (i) the sequential scheme where the map U ϕ acts on one probe N times and (ii) the parallel entangled-scheme where an entangled state of N probes goes through N maps U ϕ in parallel (see Fig. 1 ). In the latter case, entanglement among the N probes is necessary, whereas separable states can only achieve the standard quantum limit scaling of 1/N [20] .
The outline of the paper follows. In the first section, we summarize the key results of quantum metrology, then detail how it can be turned into cryptographic protocols involving one, two or an arbitrary number of parties.
Two quantum metrology strategies which achieve the Heisenberg limit: (i) the sequential strategy where probes goes through the map N times sequentially; (ii) the parallelentangled strategy: a state of N probes goes through N maps in parallel. The channel Uϕ encodes the parameter to be estimated onto the probe states. The channels are also subjected to possible manipulation by an eavesdropper, Eve, denoted by the regions shaded orange.
its state is 
, whence one can estimate the parameter ϕ. After repeating the estimation procedure ν times, the error in the estimation asymptotically in ν attains the inequality [20] 
which corresponds to the Heisenberg limit. However, using purely N-probe NOON states only allows the phase to be estimated modulo 2π/N because there are N fringes in 2π. To resolve this ambiguity, smaller NOON states with N = 1, 2, 4... also have to be used, adding a small overhead to the precision in Eq. (1) [25] [26] [27] .
Transforming a metrology protocol into a quantum cryptographically secure ones is simple in the one-party scenario, where a single party (Alice) is in charge both of the preparation and measurement (e.g. a radioaltimeter, where the airplane's antenna is both the signal source and receiver). We require that Eve cannot extract information on ϕ without risking being caught, even if she is in charge of the channel between Alice and the maps U ϕ . Namely, we assign Eve the possibility of performing arbitrary joint transformations on the probes both after Alice's preparation and before Alice's measurement.
The cryptographic protocol requires Alice to choose randomly to prepare the probe state |Ψ
with probability η and one of the decoy states in {|λ a , |λ b , |λ ± ab } each with probability 1−η 4 , where
If she had prepared |Ψ 
, whence she obtains ϕ. Instead, when she had prepared a decoy state, she performs a projective measurement onto the basis in which she had prepared it. If the measurement outcome does not match her preparation, then Alice knows Eve has been tampering with the probes and the protocol is terminated.
The yield of the protocol η, but the root-mean-square error is 2/η times with respect to Eq. 1: since the probe states we use consist of a tensor product of two NOON states each with N/2 probes, they achieve quantum Fisher information N 2 /2. Then, on average 1−η fraction of the states are employed as decoys: asymptotically in ν, the achievable variance is ∆ϕ
If large NOON states are not available, Alice can evolve the N = 2 state N times sequentially in the channel and achieve the same precision ( Fig. 1 (i) ). This is at the expense of her waiting time being increased by a factor N .
Since Eve has complete control of the channel, she can always hijack Alice's probes to perform the estimation herself, but only if she is willing to get caught.
If Alice had prepared a probe state state, she cannot find out that Eve is interacting with the probes. Instead if Alice had prepared a decoy state, Eve will be caught with probability 1/4. So Eve's probability of successfully evading detection will be (1 − Note that, if Eve cannot access the channel twice, then the protocol is unconditionally secure, since from her point of view the state propagating in the channel is a mixed state, which is useless for parameter estimation since it does not acquire any phase during the interaction U ϕ .
In two-party protocols Alice is in charge of the state preparation and Bob is responsible for the measurements (e.g. a distance measurement using light pulses and synchronized clocks). They both wish to recover the parameter in a way that is cheat-sensitive (or unconditionally secure under the hypothesis that Eve can access the probes only once). The procedure is inspired by the BB84 protocol.
The state preparation is the same as for the single party protocol: Alice chooses randomly to prepare |Ψ ± probe with probability η, and |λ a , |λ b , |λ ⊗2 on the latter is ±1 deterministically. Immediately after Bob's measurement, they use a public channel to check their choice of measurement basis and discard all the cases when they do not agree (see Fig. 2 ). If Alice had sent a decoy state and Bob measured in the correct basis, they know an eavesdropper is present and they terminate if the result does not match the preparation.
Once they confirm that their communication is secure, Alice announces whether she has prepared |Ψ Six states are necessary for the two-party protocol, because alternating between the plus or minus probe state ensures that their communication is meaningless to a third party, if the probes have been exchanged securely. The probability of Eve being undetected is (1 −
ν . This can be improved if Alice and Bob share a secret bit string in advance such that Bob knows which basis to choose, in which case Eve's probability of being undetected is (1 −
)
ν . In addition, if Eve only has access to one end of the channel, then she cannot gain any information at all, even if she intercepts all the probes and the communication between Alice and Bob.
The two-party protocol achieves a quantum Fisher information yield of 1 4 η(η + 1) with respect to the optimal estimation, but the achievable precision on ϕ for each party is ∆ϕ
2 . This is due to the fact, with probability η 2 + η 1−η 2 they both choose the phase sensitive basis, and each party estimates the parameter from only half the remaining copies of the probe states. This reduction is only a constant factor, and the efficiency of the scheme can be improved by using techniques such as those described in Ref. [28] . Addition-
Alice sends either |Ψ ± probe or a decoy state into the quantum channel which encodes the parameter ϕ onto the probes. Bob randomly chooses to measure the observablê O ± N/2 or projects onto one of the basis of the decoy states. They retain only the copies for which their choice of basis agree, denoted by the solid blue markers. The probes are also subjected to possible manipulation by an eavesdropper, Eve, denoted by regions shaded orange.
ally, if they share in advance a unique bit string securely and agree on the choice of measurement basis, the yield can be improved to that of the one-party protocol.
We now examine the multiple party scenario. Alice wishes to measure and transmit the parameter to some trusted parties, but they can only uncover the parameter when they meet and collaborate, analogously to quantum secret-sharing schemes [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] [34] . Here Alice is in charge of state preparation and we assume that ϕ is encoded by maps U ϕ in the channels that separates her from Bob. If the secret is to be shared among k trusted parties excluding Alice, she prepares |Φ ± probe = |Φ ± N/2 ⊗2 and |Φ eig with probabilities η and 1 − η, where
and |Φ eig is an element chosen randomly from {|λ x , |λ y , 1/ √ 2(|λ x ± |λ y )}, where
When she prepares |Φ ± probe , she sends N/2 probes from each of the |Φ ± N/2 into the quantum channel to Bob, and one each to the other k − 1 parties.
The state |Φ ± probe evolves to
Now, if every party would independently choose randomly an observable to measure with probability η, the scheme would be exponentially inefficient as the probability of them all matching is η(η+
To overcome this, they need to first agree on a sequence of measurement basis in a secure way: Alice can perform a BB84 quantum key distribution separately with each participant. Then she will share a unique secret bit string with each of them. She then compares these bit strings, uses one as a reference and instructs the rest to match theirs to it by performing a series of bit flip operations. This is a secure step as she is just instructing which bit to flip, never communicating the bit's initial or final value.
The parties then agree to project onto |λ m , |λ M (|λ a,b for Bob) at the jth iteration of the protocol if the jth two-bit value is 00, given Alice will send |λ x / |λ y . If the bit pare value is 01 or 01, then they project ontô O + (Ô + N/2 for Bob), as Alice will send |Φ ± probe or |λ ± xy , respectively. MeasuringÔ ± N +2k−2 on |λ ± xy will yield the outcome ±1.
As Alice sends through the states, they check the outcomes on the decoys: if the measurements of all k parties do not match Alice's preparation, they know an eavesdropper is present and they abort the protocol.
At the end of the protocol (this stage can be delayed arbitrarily), Alice announces whether she prepared |Φ 2 . As for the other parties, they now need to correlate their measurement outcomes in order to uncover ϕ. They do so by also calculating Ô N/2+k−1 . Without information from any of the participants, the rest of the results are useless, since this would be equivalent to tracing out one probe from a maximally entangled state, which renders the measurement outcome of the rest completely random.
The yield of this protocol is η, with the addition of 4kν qubits used for quantum key distribution and the 2ν(k − 1) extra probes that do not interact with U ϕ .
CONCLUSION
By combining techniques from quantum metrology and quantum cryptography, we have defined a general framework for quantum cryptographic protocols specifically suited to the task of securing parameter estimation while retaining the highest available precision. Adversaries can gain some information on the parameter, but at the risk of being detected. We devised protocols for single parameter estimation involving an arbitrary number of parties.
For single parameter estimation, Alice prepares the probe state |Ψ ± probe with probability η, and the decoy states {|λ a/b , |λ ± ab } each with equal probability 1−η 4 . If Eve wants to minimize her probability of getting caught while still obtaining some information, her best strategy would be to try to discriminate which decoy state Alice has prepared, and send this back to Alice. For the decoy states we have considered, the maximum discrimination probability is 2/S, where S is the number of symmetric states in the set [41] .
Eve can achieve this as followed: since she does not get caught if Alice prepares a probe state, Eve always makes a guess on the the decoy state basis that Alice chose and performs a von Neumann measurement in that basis.
When a decoy state is prepared, Eve will make an incorrect guess 1/2 of the time. When she is correct, the state she sends back to Alice will correlate with Alice's preparation and Eve is undetected. When Eve is incorrect, she sends a state in the wrong basis -but half the time, when Alice performs a measurement, it will collapse to be what she prepared. Therefore in a one-party scenario, the probability of Eve's cheat undetected is (1 − (1−η) 
)
ν . To increase the probability of detecting Eve whilst keeping the same efficiency η, Alice can use more complementary bases sets in the decoy state space, for example, including also 1/ √ 2(|λ a ± i |λ b ). In this example, the probability that Eve will incorrectly guess the basis is now 2/3, which means She gets away with probability (1 −
2 ) ν instead. In the two-party protocol, the probability that Bob chooses correct basis for the decoy state is
since there are two complementary bases, and the same projector for both |Ψ ± probe and |λ ± ab . Only from these they can reveal Eve's presence. However, Eve can make a random guess on the basis, where she will be correct half the time, and the other half the time she will get caught with probability 1/2. Therefore the probability of catching Eve is (1 −
ν . The strategy of using more basis sets can also be used in the two-party scenario, provided Alice and Bob share a bit string in advance.
encoded in the unitary operator
where the total Hermitian operator is H d = d j=1 H j , and H j = |λ j λ j | [35] commute with each other. In Ref. [36] it was shown that it is possible to measure them simultaneously in a way that outperforms the best individual estimation schemes. If the channel can be sampled N times and there are d unknown parameters, the optimal state takes the form
where 
This is smaller than estimating the d phases individually, where the total variance is
We focus on this estimation scheme and derive protocols for one and two-party scenarios, as it is unknown whether the quantum Cramér-Rao bound can be achieved by using separable measurements. See Refs. [37, 38] for more detailed reviews on multiple parameter estimation.
In a one-party scenario, Alice uses the parallelentangled strategy by preparing with probability η the state |ψ N/(d+1) probe
⊗d+1
, and with probability (1 − η) a decoy states from the set {|l } or the set {|f }.
Using m j to denote the j th element from the m th permutation of the set {0, 1, .., d} which there are (d + 1)! in total, the m th and k th element from {|l } and {|f } are given by
The states in Eqs. (14) are higher dimensional generalizations to the ones in Eq. (4)-(5). For example, for d = 1 and N = 3, the elements in {|l } are
and {|f } is given by taking the Fourier transform of the elements of {|l }. The decoy states are constructed in this way to ensure that 1. they do not evolve under the unitary of the quantum channel, which in set |f requires an equal number of qudits in each level.
2. they maximise the probability of detecting Eve (her probability of being undetected if she has guessed the wrong basis is now 1/(d + 1)!).
She sends them into the channel. When she prepares a probe state, she performs the optimal measurement on each of the |ψ N/(d+1) probe for the parameter estimation after retrieving it. From the combination of the plus and minus in the state |ψ probe of (11) she had prepared she deduces the parameters ϕ j from the measurement outcomes. The optimal measurement basis can be constructed using the method in Ref. [36] , which corresponds to projectors onto the eigenbasis of the symmetric logarithmic derivative relating to the parameters [38] [39] [40] . Instead when she had prepared the decoys, she projects onto the the bases in which she prepared it. If the outcome does not agree with her preparation, she knows an eavesdropper is present and she aborts. The probability of Eve cheating undetected is then ( The two-party case is a natural extension of the above protocol. With the parallel-entangled strategy, Alice prepares |ψ N/(d+1) probe with probability η, or a decoy state. Upon receiving the state, Bob either randomly decides to perform the optimal measurement, or to project onto the |l or |f d . As each state is measured, they reconcile their choice of bases and discard the result if they do not agree. In the absence of an eavesdropper, Bob's outcome when he projects onto {|l } or {|f } should match Alice's preparation. After they confirmed this, Alice discloses in which combination of the plus and minus she has prepared the probe state on half the copies, and Bob reveals his measurement outcome on the other half, and from the statistics they can uncover the parameters ϕ j .
For this two-party protocol, Alice chooses |ψ probe with a uniform distribution over all 2 d possible combinations of plus and minuses. This implies that to all parties ignorant of these values, the state is an equallyweighted density matrix ρ = [β 2 (|λ 0 λ 0 |)
⊗d+1 which contains no phase information. This is needed to ensure that the information they exchange is useless to other parties. As in the single-parameter case, if Eve has access to the channel only once, she cannot gain any information on any of the parameters even if she intercepts the probes and overhears their classical communication.
However, it is unclear whether the bound in Eq. (12) is achievable when the input state is averaged over all the possible configurations, and Bob uses only one set of measurement basis. This problem can be solved if Alice and Bob share a secret bit string in advance, in which Bob can adjust the phases of projectors accordingly.
